Under Article 200 of the Constitution the Governor of Mizoram has a duty to consider bills for conformity with the Constitution before giving assent. From the sources, it is not clear whether assent was given or the Governor has reserved the bill for Presidential consideration in view of the question of the ST criteria. This uncertainty affects both the legal enforceability of the provisions challenged and the standing of the petition.
The responsibility of the Supreme Court is just as great. The petition presents novel constitutional questions that have not been previously addressed. Article 371G has not been considered in the light of the regime of fundamental rights, as it should have been in this case. The “constitutional morality” doctrine of the Court, developed in Sabarimala and Navtej Singh Johar, has not been extended to tribal customs protected by special constitutional provisions. The question which is of national importance is whether the doctrine applies to Article 371G. Since the case has a precedent-setting character, the Court should list the petition at an early date and consider referring the constitutional questions involved to a larger bench.
Notably, the central government has not commented. The Ministry of Home Affairs and the Ministry of Tribal Affairs have not expressed any opinion on a matter that goes to Scheduled Tribe criteria and the constitutional division of law-making power. The Home Ministry brokered the 1986 Mizo Accord which provided the framework for Article 371G. This amendment pushes the boundaries of that framework. The silence of the Centre is a governance gap.
The National Commission for Women, which has a statutory mandate to protect women’s constitutional rights, has not filed an application to intervene, nor has it conducted an independent study on the effect of the amendment. The Commission’s intervention would therefore strengthen the institutional response to the petition, as the amendment includes an explicit discrimination on grounds of sex.
There are competing narratives about this amendment, and they are worth looking at fairly. The story of tribal preservation and identity protection is based on the Constitution. Article 371G gives express protection to Mizo customary law. The Mizo Accord of 1986 recognised cultural autonomy for the community. The Mizo social organization has been patrilineal for a long time. But the particular gender asymmetry introduced by the 2026 amendment is not found in traditional customary law. The 2014 Act itself covered all Mizo persons irrespective of the spouse. The amendment’s classification appears to be a legislative innovation rather than a codification of the usual kind. It requires a constitutional justification that the state has not yet offered.
The story of gender equality and constitutional rights is no less rooted in constitutional text. Articles 14, 15 and 21 provide for equality, non-discrimination and dignity. This amendment results in classification on the basis of gender and choice of matrimony. The Supreme Court has used constitutional morality to invalidate discriminatory customs in other contexts. The statutory text and the public statements made by the Chief Minister also support the petitioner’s argument that the amendment punishes a woman’s choice to marry outside the community.
The story of legislative federalism and state autonomy is a true story and is protected by the true constitutional protection in Article 371G. The Mizoram Legislative Assembly has wide powers over Mizo customary law. The amendment was democratically adopted. But not all state legislation is protected from fundamental rights review under federalism. Article 32 is a direct remedy against the state action which violates the guarantees given under the Constitution. The question is not whether the Assembly has power to legislate on marriage and inheritance, but whether that power can be used in a manner which discriminates on grounds of sex.
The institutional evaluation leads to the following conclusions. The Mizoram Legislative Assembly exercised its legislative power but did not exercise the power to see that the amendment did not violate the constitutional duty to prevent discrimination on the basis of gender. This is a documented step backwards, taking away protections for women* while leaving protections for men.* The wider application of the 2014 Act belies the state government’s claim that the amendment simply clarifies customary law. The role of the Governor in reviewing this bill for compliance with the constitution is not clear. The Supreme Court has a duty to give constitutional clarity to the interplay of Article 371G and fundamental rights. The central government’s silence on a matter of Scheduled Tribe criteria and federal legislative power is an institutional failure of coordination.
The governance lessons extend beyond the immediate case. The amendment is an example of how the codification of customary law, without a proper gender-impact assessment, can be used to discriminate. The 2014 Act has demonstrated that preservation of tribal identity and gender equality can be complementary. The 2026 amendment suggests that policy choices can be made for exclusion without sufficient documentary support. The absence of clarity on gubernatorial assent creates legal uncertainty for the citizens concerned. The lack of a national government position on modification of the ST criteria reflects a failure of policy coordination.
The following recommendations derive directly from this analysis.
The Mizoram Legislative Assembly should conduct a mandatory gender impact assessment before making further amendments to personal laws. It ought to publish records of legislative debate that reflect consideration of constitutional equality. It should reconsider its decision to withdraw the protection of women’s personal property under Section 26(1), which is a regression from the 2014 framework.
Since the case is precedent-setting and there is no judicial guidance on the interaction of Article 371G with fundamental rights, the Supreme Court of India should list the petition for hearing on a priority basis and consider referring the constitutional questions to a larger bench.
In case there is a pending assent from the Governor of Mizoram for the Amendment, the Governor of Mizoram has to look into the question of the Amendment being in conformity with Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution and if the Governor of Mizoram is to grant assent, he may also consider reserving the Bill for the consideration of the President of India in view of the fact that there is a question as to the legislative competence of the legislature of Mizoram to enact the Amendment in view of Articles 341 and 342 of the Constitution.
Does the Ministry of Tribal Affairs need to make clear if state legislatures can change Scheduled Tribe criteria through marriage and inheritance laws? If the matter concerns the central government it should file an affidavit in the Supreme Court.
The National Commission for Women should file an intervention application in the Supreme Court petition apart from conducting an independent study to see the impact of the amendment on Mizo women in inter-community marriages.
Lalsangliani Colney’s case is not a lone complaint. It is a constitutional test as to whether India’s framework for tribal autonomy can accommodate gender equality without compromising either. The 2014 Act shows that codification can be done regarding customary law and it extends protections to women. The 2026 amendment reveals those protections can be undone by the same legislative process. The final decision of the Supreme Court will decide if Article 371G is a shield to protect tribal identity or a shield to protect from constitutional scrutiny. The determination will have implications not just for Mizoram but for every northeast state where special constitutional protections intersect with the fundamental rights of individual citizens. The constitutionality of governance requires institutions to reconcile, not choose between, these values. The petition before the Supreme Court is an opportunity to lay out how that reconciliation should happen.
Editor's Note: This is the second of two parts. The constitutional challenge discussed herein remains pending before the Supreme Court. Institutional evaluation is based on the documentary record available at the time of publication.
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